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STATUS AND TRENDS IN STATE PRODUCT
LIABILITY LAW: PUNITIVE DAMAGES
INTRODUCTION
Punitive damages are awarded to punish for outrageous conduct or
to deter future similar conduct.' Damages are based on "the defendant's
evil motive or his reckless indifference" toward others, the nature and
extent of harm and the wealth of the defendant. 2 Punitive damages have
their roots in English common law.'
Several theories explain the development of punitive damages. First,
appellate courts are reluctant to grant new trials when excessive damages
are awarded at trial.4 The desire to compensate a plaintiff for otherwise
uncompensable injuries is another factor.5 Punitive damages have also
6
been characterized as a judicial attempt to fill gaps in the criminal law.
Although punitive damages developed primarily in the area of inten7
tional torts, they have been extended to the product liability area. Almost
every jurisdiction allows punitive damage awards.' Today, along with
many other aspects of the tort and insurance systems, states are reevaluating the effectiveness of punitive damage awards in the product liability
1.
2.

3.

4.
5.
6.

7.
8.

See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979); 5 M. MINZER, J. NATES, C. KIMBALL & D.
AXELROD, DAMAGEs IN TORT ACTIONS § 40.12(1) (1986).
M. MINZER, J. NATES; C. KIMBALL & D. AXELROD, supra note 1, at 40.12(1).

One of the earliest cases awarding punitive damages was based on illegal entry for which the
jury went beyond compensatory purposes to show public outrage at such a daring attack. Huckle
v. Money, 2 Wils. K.B. 206, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (1763). Other rationales were articulated as the
concept of punitive damages developed. See, e.g., Tullidge v. Wade, 3 Wils. K.B. 18, 95 Eng.
Rep. 909 (1769) (compensating for uncompensable injuries). For general historical development,
see Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REv. 1258, 1262-68,
(1976); Mallor & Roberts, Punitive Damages: Toward a PrincipledApproach, 31 HASTINGS L.J.
639, 642-43 (1980).
Courts look for a justification in permitting such high awards. See Mallor & Roberts, supra
note 3, at 642.
What was originally uncompensable, such as pain and suffering, is now included in compensatory
awards. Id.
Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437, 449 (1980) ("Suffice it to say
that whatever shortcomings the award of punitive damages may have, nevertheless, it must be
remembered that it has the effect of bringing to punishment types of conduct that though
oppressive and hurtful to the individual almost invariably go unpunished by the public prosecutor.").
See Am. BAR Ass'N, REPORT OF THE ABA ACTION COMM'N TO IMROVE THE TORT LijatLrry
SYSTEM (1987) at 16 [hereinafter cited as ABA REPORT].
Only five states forbid punitive damages: Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Hampshire
and Washington. Colorado, Florida and Oklahoma have capped punitive damages, while
Minnesota restricted filings for punitive damages. The Impact of Tort Reform, Bus. INS., May
11, 1987, at 1. See, e.g., Ricard v. State, 390 So. 2d 882, 884 (La. 1980); City of Lowell v.
Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 313 Mass. 257, 269-70, 47 N.E.2d 265, 272 (1943); Miller
v. Kingsley, 194 Neb. 123, 230 N.W.2d 472 (1975); Kammerer v. Western Gear Corp., 27 Wash.
App. 512, 521-22, 618 P.2d 1330, 1337 (1980) (no punitive damages in absence of statutory
authoization).
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area and are attempting to control them through case law and legislation. 9
Some advocates of punitive damages have reformulated their opinions. 10
Interest groups have taken sides concerning the need for product liability
reform." This section presents the policies for and against punitive damages and various solutions proposed and adopted by states to deal with
distrust of the current system.
POLICIES SUPPORTING PUNITIVE DAMAGES
The key functions of punitive damages in the U.S. tort system are
deterrence and punishment. 12 Public policy has determined certain conduct
to be so reprehensible that ordinary damages are not sufficient to prevent
the conduct from recurring." One primary objective of the deterrent
function is to prevent businesses from treating compensatory damages as
a cost of doing business. 4 The deterrent nature of punitive damages also
encourages manufacturers to take affirmative steps in product safety."
Punitive damages achieve retribution for the plaintiff by encouraging
private law enforcement and compensating the plaintiff for litigation
expenses.' 6 Not only do punitive damages have the direct effect of pun9.

More than half the states have acted on tort reform in 1985 and 1986 on issues of pain and
suffering and punitive damages. See McKay, ABA House to Review Tort Report, NAT'L L.J.,
Feb. 16, 1987, at 17.
10. In 1976, Professor Owen strongly supported punitive damages as a necessary tool in tort
litigation. See Owen, supra note 3. Six years later, Professor Owen updated his analysis of
punitive damages, arguing for strong controls. See Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive
Damages Against Manufacturers of Defective Products, 49 U. Cm. L. REv. 1 (1982).
11. The newly formed American Tort Reform Association-a business, trade and professional
coalition-is advocating caps on damage awards and limiting the "deep pocket." On the other
side, the American Trial Lawyers Association lobbies for curbing tort reform. See Strasser, 1987
Focus on States: Both Sides Brace for Tort Battle, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 16, 1987, at 1. The
American Bar Association recently reported its recommendations; ABA REPORT, supra note 7,
at 16.
12. See, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 382-3
(1981) (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West 1970)); Hammond v. North American Asbestos
Corp., 97 Ill. 2d 195, 454 N.E.2d 210, 219 (1983); Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 684 P.2d
187, 217-18 (Colo. 1984). See also Ausness, Retribution and Deterrence: The Role of Punitive
Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 Ky. L.J. 1, 38-92 (1985); Owen, supra note 3, at
1277, 1279-87; Mallor & Roberts, supra note 3, at 648-50.
13. One court has described this level of conduct as an evil intent or "special ill-will or wanton
disregard of duty or gross or outrageous conduct." Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d
260, 294 N.W.2d 437, 443 (1980). For discussion of conduct, see infra notes 55-65 and
accompanying text.
14. Although compensatory damages may reach large amounts, alone they are often insufficient as
a deterrent. Entrepreneurs may continue to market a dangerous product as long as the projected
compensatory damages remain less than the cost of remedying the defect. See, e.g., Neal v.
Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357, 376 (1982) (compensatory and punitive damages
awarded for exposure to asbestos).
15. See Arnold, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation: Redirecting the Windfall, 6 J.
PROD. LIB. 367, 370 (1983).
16. Where only small compensatory damages are appropriate, punitive damages act as an incentive
(or reward) to bring a suit where otherwise it would not financially be worthwhile; thus it keeps
a check on manufacturers' conduct. Part of this incentive is that plaintiffs can cover their
attorneys' fees (that part of the recovery that is paid as part of the contingency fee system-
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ishment, deterrence and retribution, but they may indirectly encourage
settlement. 17 In a8 more general sense, punitive damages act as a costspreading device.1
PROBLEMS CREATED BY PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Although punitive damages are important in controlling conduct, they
can produce unintended consequences. 19 The severity of these consequences
must be weighed against the policies for punitive damages in order to
determine whether to eliminate or modify punitive damages.
Preventing manufacturers from treating damages as a cost of doing
business and encouraging product safety are laudatory goals, but their

implementation can conflict with the manufacturer's traditional cost-

benefit analysis.20 The court may encounter problems by becoming too
involved in the manufacturer's economic business decisions. The complexity of product manufacturing and continuous product improvement
make judging safety standards difficult.
Because product manufacturing and distribution is so complex and
on a nationwide scale, it often is argued that a problem with one product
could result in thousands of suits. 2' The fear of multiple damages has
allowing the plaintiff to receive a full compensatory award) and other litigation expenses. See
Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 383 (1981). See also
Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437, 449 (1980) (the court noted in
its earlier holding that the self-interest of the plaintiff also benefited society by bringing to trial
an action that ordinarily would escape criminal prosecution).
17. Because the amount of a jury award for punitive damages remains uncertain, the manufacturer
may be willing to pay a substantial settlement, rather than risk a crippling award. Thus, the
plaintiff may avoid the time and expense of trial.
18. Rather than burdening one litigant with the financial costs, punitive damages can disperse these
costs through insurance and through corporate price setting. See Wangen v. Ford Motor Co.,
97 Wis. 2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437, 452 (1980).
19. The problems most commonly associated with punitive damages include multiple awards, adverse
impact on innocent third parties, constitutionality, lack of deterrent effect, insurability, empassioned jurors, incompatibility with strict liability, impeded investigation of claims, effect on
settlement value and improper windfall. See generally Ausness, supra note 12; Owen, supra note
3; Note, The Dubious Extension of Punitive Damage Recovery in PennsylvaniaProductsLiability
Law, 23 DUQ. L. REv. 681 (1985).
20. At some point, adding safety features to a product may become cost prohibitive. When a
product reaches its optimal safety level because of prohibitive cost or incovenience, and the
public will accept this level, higher standards should not be required. Management should be
able to maintain reasonable discretion. See Note, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Cases,
16 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 895, 910 (1976); Owen, supra note 10 at 41-42 (discussing the safety
standards set by statute and regulation; bare minimum standards below which a violation is
criminal versus carefully researched standards "close to the line of feasible technology"). See,
e.g., Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727 (Minn. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 921
(1980).
21. Asbestos litigation is a good example. Thousands of people were injured from inhalation of
asbestos over many years. See, e.g., Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 757 F.2d 506 (5th
Cir. 1984), vacated in part, 750 F.2d 1314 (5th Cir. 1985). The multiplicity problem also has
been considered in the context of other tort suits. See, e.g., Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell
Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967) (reversing a punitive award where the drug MER/29 had
resulted in many injuries because the court did not find sufficient evidence of management
misconduct); Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981)
(the faulty design of the gas tank in the Ford Pinto led to numerous suits). See also Owen,
supra note 3, at 1322-25 (critiquing the arguments surrounding multiple awards).
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been expressed in dicta, 22 but no court has expressly accepted this argument
to set aside punitive damages. 23 Some courts have, however, recognized
the need for mitigation of the often harsh results of multiple punitive
damage awards.14 Businesses fear that this multiplicity of awards ultimately
will drive them to bankruptcy. 25 The policy argument supporting this fear
relies on the adverse economic impact of bankruptcy on third parties.
Critics argue that not only does bankruptcy remove a company and its
2
26
but it harms workers, 27 shareholders,
products from the market,

22.

Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839 (2d Cir. 1967) ("We have the gravest
difficulty in perceiving how claims for punitive damages in such a multiplicity of actions
throughout the nation can be so administered as to avoid overkill."); Jackson v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 506, 526 (5th Cir. 1984), vacated in part, 750 F.2d 1314 (5th Cir. 1985)
(holding punitive damages inappropriate in asbestos litigation, the court said "[t]he anticipation
of multiple litigation for compensation damages serves in this instance as an effective deterrent
to future illicit conduct"); Seltzer, Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Litigation: Addressing the
Problems of Fairness, Efficiency and Control, 52 FoRPHAM L. REv. 37, 55 (1983) (concluding
that at some point punishment becomes overkill).
23. See, e.g., Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357, 376 (1982) (noting this was
the first award against Johns-Manville Sales Corp. in the asbestos litigation, the court rejected
arguments concerning future claimants); Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757,
174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 383 (1981) (refusing to set aside punitive damages, the court noted that,
"[flollowed to its logical conclusio'n, [the argument] would mean that punitive damages could
never be assessed against a manufacturer of a mass-produced article"); Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson
Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727, 740-41 (Minn. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 921 (1980) (the mere
possibility of future litigation is not a reason to dismiss damages in a present case).
24. See, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 384 (1981)
(court noted that the "multiplicity of awards may present a problem" and suggested that Ford
raise the issue of previous awards in any later litigation for the same conduct).
25. The combination of many punitive recoveries and large awards on top of compensatory damages
could exhaust the resources of less financially sound companies. See Brotherton v. Celotex
Corp., 202 N.J. Super. 148, 493 A.2d 1337, 1343-44 (1985) (allowing punitive recovery in
asbestos litigation, but suggesting that such awards should not cause financial ruin); but see
Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 757 F.2d 506, 520-21 (5th Cir. 1984), vacated in part,
750 F.2d 1314 (5th Cir. 1985) (under Mississippi law, the court disallowed punitive damages so
the businesses could remain viable in order to effectuate loss distribution); Fischer v. JohnsManville Sales Corp., 193 N.J. Super. 113, 128, 472 A.2d 577, 586 (App. Div. 1984), aff'd,
103 N.J. 643, 512 A.2d 466 (1986) (threat of insolvency from punitive damages exaggerated);
Owen, supra note 3, at 1324-25 ("more theoretical than real").
26. "[A] sufficiently egregious error as to one product can end the business life of a concern that
has wrought much good in the past and might otherwise have continued to do so in the future
....
Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 841 (2d Cir. 1967) (reversing a
punitive award from the sale of MER/29). The court also stated that public policy could suggest
that the enforcement of punitive damages might do more harm than good because the manufacturer provides a necessary and socially beneficial product. Because the government regulates
the drug industry, the manufacturer needs no additional punishment to indicate social disapproval. Id.
Evidence from a study of 232 large corporations showed that, of the 25% that have taken
products off the market because of liability concerns, the income lost was very small when
compared with sales income. N. WEBER, PRODUCTS LIABnLrTy: THE Cosu'oRA.
REsPoNSE 15
(1987). See also Sales, The Emergence of Punitive Damages in Products Liability Actions: A
Further Assault on the Citadel, 14 ST. MARY's L.J. 351, 397-401 (1983).
27. Employees have no part in the decision process and, thus, no individual moral responsibility.
Employees and other third parties feel the ripple effect of punitive damages. See Note, supra
note 19, at 700-01 (concluding that the unfairness of affecting third parties justifies reappraisal
and reform in punitive damages); Owen, supra note 10, at 15-16. But see N. WEBER, supra note
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consumers29 and downstream plaintiffs.30 Corporate bankruptcy is tantamount to human death, and some courts have declared that "punitive
damages should sting, not kill."'" Courts must consider the conflicting
interests, the company's interest in remaining viable, other human interests
represented by the corporation, the plaintiff's interest in maximizing his
award and future plaintiffs' interest in having something left from which
to collect.
The prospect of excessive damages, as well as multiple damages, has
brought criticism of punitive damages in the product liability area.3 2 Much33
of the criticism surrounds juries' wide discretion in awarding damages.
Proponents of punitive damages note the numerous protective devices
controlling punitive awards,3 4 including judicial controls through remittitur
at the trial and appellate levels. 35 Other noted consequences of punitive

28.

29.
30.

31.
32.
33.

34.

35.

26, at 15 (indicating that less than six percent of the corporations studied laid off employees
within three years of product liability problems).
Reductions in the company's earnings or injury to the company's competitive position directly
affect shareholders. See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 841 (2d Cir. 1967)
(shareholders suffer "extinction of their investments for a single management sin"). Most courts
have rejected this argument on the ground that the investors elect the board of directors and,
thus, knowingly accept the risk. See, e.g., Martin v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 322 Pa. Super.
348, 469 A.2d 655, 664-65 (1983) (upholding punitive damages in asbestos litigation, the court
suggested that the shareholders are not "innocent"); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d
260, 294 N.W.2d 437, 453 (1980) ("investors should not enjoy ill-gotten gains"). But see Note,
supra note 19, at 700 (in large corporations only those investors with large blocks of stock have
say in management, but the small investor is equally punished).
Consumers lose the benefits of products lost or products not put into the market. See supra
note 26 and accompanying text.
Multiple awards present the problem of limited defendants' funds from which current and
potential plaintiffs may recover. In the Dalkon Shield litigation, for example, A.H. Robins was
faced with compensatory claims of more than $500 million and punitive claims of more than
$2.3 billion, but it had net worth of only $280 million. This raised "the unconscionable
possibility that large numbers of plaintiffs who [were] not first in line at the courthouse door
will be deprived of a practical means of redress." In re Northern District of California "Dalkon
Shield" IUD Products Liability Litigation, 526 F. Supp. 887, 893 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
Id. at 899.
See Note, supra note 19, at 709. But see Daniels, Punitive Damages: The Real Story, A.B.A.
J., Aug. 1986, at 60, 63 (most punitive damages claims are unsuccessful).
See Note, supra note 19, at 709 (wide jury discretion is more "appropriate in one-on-one torts"
than in product liability cases). See also Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 684 P.2d 187, 21920 (Colo. 1984) (the court denied Robins' claims that a $6.2 million award was excessive and
that economic status was not proper for the jury to consider; the court held the award not "a
product of passion and prejudice" by the jury and noted various controls preventing excessive
awards).
In the ABA's report on tort reform, the committee noted the great discretion given to juries
and generally advocated more rigorous procedures for determining punitive damages. See ABA
REPORT, supra note 7, at 17-18.
Various methods have been applied and proposed in exerting some control over punitive awards:
post-judgment mitigation, consideration of past and future punitive awards, consideration of
wealth, direct limits on awards, reasonable relation to compensatory damages and condition
precedent of actual damages. See infra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc. v. Day, 615 P.2d 621, 624 (Alaska 1980) (the appellate
court found error at the trial level where the trial judge did not rule on the question of
remittitur; appellate court reduced $2.9 million award to $500,000, modifying a previous reduction
to $250,000), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 84 (1980); Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App.
3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981) (the court reduced a $125 million award to $3.5 million).
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damages are their disruptive effect on settlement,3 6 their hindrance of
investigations"7 and their effect on third parties.38 Opponents of punitive
damages argue that manufacturers avoid the deterrent objective of punitive
awards by passing costs to consumers who should not bear the burden
of the company's mistake.3 9 Opponents similarly cite insurance as a limit
to deterrence 0
Manufacturers and commentators continue to argue that excessive
and multiple damage awards render punitive damages unconstitutional,
although the argument has yet to succeed. 41 The arguments concerning
multiple damages center on fifth and fourteenth amendment violations of
double jeopardy42 and fundamental fairness.4 3 Recently, large punitive

36.
37.

38.
39.

40.

41.

42.

Critics argue that the unpredictability in even occasional high awards will distort the settlement
process. The defendant is forced to settle at an inflated amount for fear of a rare multi-million
dollar award. ABA REPORT, supra note 7, at 17.
The fear of such awards may cause companies to destroy any information surrounding a product,
even trivial records, notwithstanding criminal laws designed to deal with obstruction of justice.
See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Coulter, 426 So. 2d 1108, 1110 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (in
a product liability action for a defective airplane door, evidence reflected that management
ordered the test pilot to destroy any records in his possession concerning problems with the
plane).
Even though an award does not result in bankruptcy, the extreme effect of multiple and excessive
awards, such awards still negatively affect third parties. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying
text.
The company can avoid the deterrence and punishment by increasing prices to consumers, thus,
the consumer shoulders the burden that was intended for its protection. Unlike shareholders,
consumers have not agreed to accept this risk. See, e.g., Gold v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,
553 F. Supp. 482, 484 (D.N.J. 1982) (the court, applying New Jersey law, would nov extend
punitive damages to a strict liability action, reasoning that the cost of poor management decisions
should not be pushed on to consumers). But see Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260,
294 N.W.2d 437, 452 (1980) (the court reasoned that passing on costs to consumers served the
purpose of risk distribution and noted that, due to the risk of losing reputation and competitive
position, the defendant could not necessarily pass on all its costs). See generally Note, supra
note 19, at 696-700.
Advocates of punitive damages argue that probable increases in insurance premiums, combined
with possible injury to the manufacturer's market position, can prevent a company from passing
on these costs to consumers. Martin v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 322 Pa. Super. 348, 469
A.2d 655, 663-64 (1983). The insurability of punitive damages is discussed in infra notes 49-52
and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc. v. Day, 615 P.2d 621 (Alaska 1980) (the court rejected
claims that punitive damages violated due process guarantees because of inadequate standards
for the jury); Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 383
(1981) (Ford argued without success that the California statute allowing punitive damages
permitted "an unlawful delegation of legislative power because it fail[ed to provide sufficient
guidance to the judge and jury"); Brotherton v. Celotex Corp., 202 N.J. Super. 148, 493 A.2d
1337, 1344 (1985) (finding no supporting case law, the court rejected arguments that punitive
damages violated the Commerce Clause and due process and constituted criminal punishment
requiring constitutional guarantees); see generally Jeffries, A Comment on the Constitutionality
of Punitive Damages, 72 VA. L. REv. 139 (1986); Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for
Reforming Punitive Damages Procedures, 69 VA. L. REv. 269 (1983); West, Mass Product
Litigation Tests Tort System, LmGATION NEws, Summer 1984, at 3.
Defendants claim that the potential for multiple punitive awards is equivalent to multiple
punishment for the same conduct. In refuting these arguments, courts do not construe the
actions as multiple awards for the same tort but as separate awards for different torts. See,
e.g., Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357, 377-78 (1982) (the conduct of the
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awards have been challenged as excessive fines under the eighth and
fourteenth amendments." Even though these amendments normally offer
protection to criminal defendants, the award of punitive damages has
been called quasi-criminal punishment
and, thus, deserving of the protec45
tions applied in criminal cases.
Opponents of punitive damages call such awards a windfall to the
plaintiff" that serve no deterrent function. 47 Courts and commentators
note, however, that plaintiffs use punitive damages to compensate for
attorneys fees and as a reward for bringing otherwise unprofitable suits. 48
Punitive damages also have been labeled as one of the major reasons for
the enormous increase in insurance premiums. 49 Critics of punitive damages
claim that insurability of these awards will prevent deterrence. 0 The crux

tortfeasor must be viewed with respect to each plaintiff); Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 684
P.2d 187, 217 (Colo. 1984) (the amendments are applicable only to criminal proceedings).
43. See, e.g., In re Northern District of California "Dalkon Shield" IUD Products Liability
Litigation, 526 F. Supp. 887, 899 (N.D. Cal. 1981) ("A defendant in a civil action has a right
to be protected against double recoveries not because they violate 'double jeopardy' but simply
because overlapping damage awards violate that sense of 'fundamental fairness' .....'); Palmer
v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 684 P.2d 187, 214 (Colo. 1984) (Colorado statute was not facially
vague so as to violate due process).
44. In Palmer v. A.H. Robins, Co., Inc., 684 P.2d 187, 217 (Colo. 1984), Robins argued that the
punitive damages statute fails to limit potential or pending awards on the same conduct in other
cases and thus, violates the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment and
excessive fines. The court held that the constitutional protections argued by Robins did not
extend to civil cases. Id.
45. These arguments have yet to be accepted. See Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 684 P.2d 187,
216 (Colo. 1984) (the court concluded that "the nature and purposes of punitive damages" did
not justify the need for the safeguards applied in criminal cases).
46. See generally Arnold, supra note 15 (discussing the appropriateness of awarding punitive damages
to a fully compensated plaintiff).
47. Id. at 369-70 (the deterrent value of a punitive award depends on removing money from the
defendant, regardless of who receives the amount).
48. See, e.g., Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., Wis. 2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437, 449-54 (1980) (punitive
damages as a practical matter cover attorneys' fees and litigation expenses, as well as "motivat[e]
reluctant plaintiffs" to bring claims); Owen, supra note 3, at 1287-99.
One study found that an average of 35% of tort awards .end up in the attorney's pocket.
U.S.

DEPT.

OF COMMERCE,

INTERAGENCY

TASK FORCE ON PRODUCTS LtABnxry: FiNAs.

REPORT

(1977), reprinted in 5 L. FRUMER & M. FREEDMAN, PRODUCTS LLIuTrry, at App. 1078 (1986).
See also Arnold, supra note 15, at 371-72 (arguing that compensatory awards should be enlarged
to make the plaintiff whole, rather than applying punitive damages haphazardly); Mallor &
Roberts, supra note 3, at 649-50.
49. Insurance companies, which normally depend on comprehensive loss records to set rates, claim
that uncertainty in the size of punitive awards prevents accurate prediction of loss exposure.
See Arnold, supra note 15, at 370. A recent study indicated that one in four companies paid
less than $50,000 in premiums in 1982 for primary coverage, whereas in 1986, the number
dropped to one in 10. In 1982, one in seven companies paid $500,000 or more in premiums,
compared with one in three in 1986. N. WEBER, supra note 26, at 4.
50. One commentator stated: "If the insured is permitted to shift his penal burden to an insurance
company, punitive damages would then clearly serve no useful purpose .... There is, of course,
no point in punishing the insurance company as it has not wronged the plaintiff or society."
Snyman, The Validity of Punitive Damages in Products Liability Cases, 44 INs. COUNSEL J.
402, 405 (1977). See also Arnold, supra note 15, at 370. But see Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell
Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 841 (2d Cir. 1967) (imposition of damages, though insurable, still deters
through higher rates or damage to reputation).
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of the dispute on punitive damages in product liability lies in whether
triers of fact should award punitive damages in strict product liability
actions. Those opposing such awards argue that, because of the lack of
fault necessary in strict liability, the punitive damage rationale is inconsistent with the notion of strict liability." At least one court has suggested
that even if a showing of fault were required, the initial determination
of
2
liability might "bleed over" and prejudice or confuse the jury. Most
courts permit punitive damages in strict liability actions."
SEARCHING FOR SOLUTIONS: STATE APPROACHES
Proper Standards and Guidelines
As the debate on punitive damages continues, state courts and legislatures search for methods to mitigate the negative consequences of
punitive awards and set clearer guidelines and standards.5 4 The standard
of conduct that allows punitive damages differs among the states in
semantics and in application." The common law definitions of the standard of culpable conduct are more broad and vague than the more uniform
and more simple statutory definitions.5 6 The National Association of
Independent Insurers advocates a move to more coherent statutory definitions.17 The traditional standards include variations of wanton, willful,
51.

See, e.g., Gold v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 553 F. Supp. 482, 484 (D.N.J. 1982) (the court
held that New Jersey law would not support punitive damages in strict product liability).
52. Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 450 F. Supp. 955, 961-62 (N.D. Tex. 1978), aff'd, 623 F.2d 395
(5th Cir. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 665 F.2d 1367 (5th Cir. 1982) (the court noted that
separate trials were possible where there was a high risk of jury confusion).
53. In response to lack of fault arguments, courts argue that the defendant's conduct is the basis
for punitive damages even in strict liability; that the fault required rises above mere negligence.
Racer v. Utterman, 629 S.W.2d 387, 396 (Mo. App. 1981). The manufacturer's conduct must
be sufficiently outrageous to go beyond the compensatory award to punitive damages. See
Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437, 443-46 (1980) ("[o]nly where
there is proof of malice or willful, wanton, reckless disregard of plaintiff's rights can punitive
damages be considered").
54. See, e.g., Fort, Granger, Polston & Wilkes, Florida's Tort Reform: Response to a Persistent
Problem, 14 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 505, 521 (1986).
55. Ten states have codified the requisite standard of conduct for punitive damages. CAL. CrV.
CODE § 3294 (West Supp. 1987) (oppression, fraud or malice); CoLo. REv. STAT. § 13-21102(l)(a) (Supp. 1986) (fraud, malice or willful and wanton); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52240b (West Supp. 1987) (reckless disregard); IowA CODE ANN. § 668A. I (Supp. 1987); Mn.N.
STAT. ANN. § 594.20 (West Supp. 1987) (willful indifference to the rights or safety of others);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221(1) (1985) (oppression, fraud, or malice, actual or presumed);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-07 (Supp. 1985) (oppression, fraud, or malice, actual or presumed);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9 (West 1987) (wanton or reckless disregard, or oppression, fraud
or malice, actual or presumed); OR. REv. STAT. § 30.925 (1985) (wanton disregard); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-3-2 (1979) (oppression, fraud, or malice, actual or presumed).
56. The National Association of Independent Insurers claims that these vague guidelines and
emotional pleas from the plaintiff's counsel can combine to cause "runaway awards." NATIONAL
AsS'N OF INDEPENDENT INSURERS, PuNITivE DAMAGES AND THE CIVIL JusTIcE SYSTEM: THE CASE
FOR REFORM AND A PLAN OF ACTION 10 (1985).

57.

See id.
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malicious, conscious or reckless disregard of the rights of others.5"

Other standards include outrageousness,5 9 gross negligence and flagrant indifference. 6l At the very least, conduct should surpass mere
negligence, but generally it must exceed "normal bounds." 62 This is the
point where the manufacturer decides to play roulette, consciously perceiving the risk of harm to product users and his own risk, weighed
against possible profits. In response to difficulties in working with the
broad standards, states have begun to tighten the legal standards by

presenting specific factors 63 to juries for consideration.6 The objective is
to introduce more consistency, accuracy and fairness into punitive damage

decisions.
Further debate revolves around which standard of proof juries must

use in weighing the evidence-preponderence of the evidence, clear and
convincing evidence or evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. 65 Most jurisdictions follow a preponderance of the evidence standard, and only one
state requires the plaintiff to provide proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 6

58.
59.
60.

61.
62.

63.

64.
65.
66.

See Owen, supra note 10, at 21 (Owen argues that his proposed "flagrant indifference" standard
fits more appropriately in product liability cases).
See, e.g., Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357, 375 (1982) (Pennsylvania
follows the standard set out in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1977), which allows
punitive damages against a defendant "to punish him for his outrageous conduct ....").
See, e.g., Stewart A. Stevenson Services, Inc. v. Pickard, 749 F.2d 635, 651 (l1th Cir. 1984)
(defining gross negligence as "entire want of care as to indicate that the act or omission in
question was the result of a conscious indifference to the rights, welfare or the safety of the
persons affected by it").
See, e.g., Moore v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., 100 Ill. App. 3d 1102, 1115, 427 N.E.2d 608,
617 (1981); Moran v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 691 F.2d 811, 815 (6th Cir. 1982).
See, e.g., Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437, 442 (1980) ("proof
of aggravating circumstances beyond those supporting compensatory damages"); Grimshaw v.
Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 361 (1981) (management went
forward with the Pinto, knowing of the gas tank's vulnerability to rupture and of the significant
risk of death or injury, and knowing that the risk could be eliminated or reduced at a feasible
cost).
Owen proposed a list of factors for guidance in product liability cases:
1. The amount of the plaintiff's litigation expenses;
2. Seriousness of the hazard to the public;
3. Profitability of the misconduct;
4. Attitude and conduct of the enterprise upon discovery;
5. Degree of the manufacturer's awareness of the hazard and of its excessiveness;
6. Number and level of employees involved in causing or covering up;
7. Duration of misconduct and its coverup;
8. Wealth of defendant and the probable impact of a judgment; and
9. Total punishment expected from other sources.
Owen, supra note 3, at 1319. For states generally using the criteria suggested by Owen, see
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20(3) (West Supp. 1987); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30.925 (1985); Sturm,
Ruger & Co., Inc. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 48 n.17 (Alaska 1979); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co.,
97 Wis. 2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437, 460 (1980).
See Owen, supra note 10, at 58-59.
See, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 775, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 387 (1981)
(the court rejected Ford's request for a jury instruction on the clear and convincing standard
rather than the preponderance standard).
In 1986, tort reform in Colorado readjusted the burden of proof from "beyond a reasonable
doubt" to "clear and convincing." CoLo. REv. STAT. § 13-25-127(2) (1973 & Supp. 1986).
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Some states and commentators follow the clear and convincing standard
and find that the quasi-criminal nature of punitive damages requires a
standard of proof between the civil standard (a mere
preponderance) and
67

the criminal standard (beyond a reasonable doubt).
Class Actions

Class actions are among the newer attempts to reduce the effect of
multiple awards and to apportion limited funds. 68 Some jurisdictions have
admitted evidence of previous damage awards or pending litigation in
69
order to give juries an impression of the possible effect of their award.
Controls on Excessive Verdicts
States have employed a variety of devices to limit potentially excessive
punitive awards. 70 Although one major call for reform has been to
encourage tighter judicial standards, 7' some jurisdictions have attempted
73
post-judgment modification 72 or permitted evidence of prior judgments.
Some state statutes permit evidence of the defendant's wealth to be
introduced at trial. 74 Although many of the control devices monitor or
67. See, e.g.,

§ 34-45-34-2 (West Supp. 1987); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30.925(1)
§ 549.20 (West Supp. 1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221(2) (1985);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9 (West 1987) (with clear and convincing proof, there is no statutory
limit to the punitive award). See also Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 85051 (2d Cir. 1967) (N.Y. court reasoned that fines were similar to criminal punishment and,
therefore required that proof be "clearly established").
68. FED. R. Crv. P. 23 governs class action suits. Through a class action, the litigation can be
focused into one manageable group, with one trial, at one time. Ideally, the manufacturer faces
a one-time punitive award, while the claimant group has the advantage of combined discovery,
reduced expenses, and a proportionate right to share in a limited fund. A class action is limited
by the timing of the suit; thus, potential claimants might not be included. The greatest problem
the courts face in a class action suit is commonality-the facts and the evidence are just not
the same in every case. For a thorough judicial analysis of class actions, see Jenkins v. Raymark
Ind., Inc., 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986) (the Court of Appeals upheld class certification for 10
plaintiffs as a "mass tort" class).
69. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20(3) (West Supp. 1987); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30.925(3)(g)
(1985); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 comment e (1977) ("It seems appropriate to
take into consideration both the punitive damages that have been awarded in prior suits and
those that may be granted in the future, with greater weight given to the prior awards.");
Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 684 P.2d 187, 215-16 (Colo. 1984) (Colorado court suggested
that evidence of satisfied and unsatisfied punitive verdicts could be introduced in a bifurcated
proceeding or that the jury could be instructed as to past punitive verdicts).
70. See infra notes 71-78 and accompanying text and supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
71. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
72. O'Gilvie v. Int'l Playtex, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 817 (D. Kan. 1985) (after the defendant followed
the trial court's instructions to acknowledge the jury's liability finding and to remove the
tampons from the market, the court modified the $10 million punitive award to $1.35 million
concluding that deterrence was achieved).
73. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
74. See, e.g., Vollert v. Summa Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1348, 1351-52 (D. Hawaii 1975) (wealth gives
the jury a point of reference without which the defendant may be prejudiced by speculation);
Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 684 P.2d 187, 219 (Colo. 1984) (the Colorado Supreme Court
listed wealth as a legitimate factor, although in this case the defendant failed to object to its
omission from the jury instructions). But see CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102(6) (wealth not a
consideration).
IND. CODE ANN.

(1985); MINN.

STAT. ANN.
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aid juries' determinations, a number of courts and commentators have
proposed bifurcated trials, separating the compensatory and punitive issues
or assigning the liability determination to juries and requiring judges to
determine the amount of any punitive award. "7
Statutory Caps
The most direct method of limiting punitive damages is to impose a
statutory cap. 76 Although few states have elected to impose a cap on
punitive awards, many states indirectly cap such awards. In the past,
some states have required punitive awards to bear a "reasonable relation"
to compensatory awards while others have required a reasonable relation
to the conduct justifying the award. 77 Most jurisdictions require the
awarding of actual damages as a condition precedent to a punitive award. 78

75.

See, e.g., Hilliard v. A.H. Robins Co., 148 Cal. App. 3d 374, 196 Cal. Rptr. 117, 129-30 (1983)
(the court of appeals upheld the trial court's implementation of a bifurcated trial); Palmer v.
A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 684 P.2d 187, 215-16 (Colo. 1984) (acknowledging bifurcation as a
suitable safeguard of the defendant's due process rights); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-240b
(West Supp. 1987) (the trier of fact determines liability while the court determines the size of
the award).
76. Statutory caps fall into two categories: a fixed dollar amount, or a fixed ratio to actual damages
or net worth. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221(6)(b) (1985) (cap of $25,000 or one
percent of the defendant's net worth, whichever is greater); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-240b
(West Supp. 1987) (cap of twice actual damages); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102(b)(3) (Supp.
1986) (ordinarily, punitive damages are less than or equal to actual damages, but they can be
raised up to three times actual damages); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(1) (West Supp. 1987) (allows
punitive damages up to three times compensatory damages-anything greater is presumed
excessive-but permits a greater award if plaintiff proves punitive liability by clear and convincing
evidence); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9 (West 1987) (limited to same amount as actual damages
unless proof by clear and convincing evidence).
77. The National Association of Independent Insurers advocates the reasonable relation rule or
stricter limits but suggests the states are moving away from the rule. In 1985, 16 states clearly
considered the relationship between compensatory and punitive damages. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
OF INDEPENDENT INsuRERs, supra note 56, at 32 (State Chart of Major Issues lists Arizona,
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, New Jersey, New York, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Utah, West Virginia and Wyoming). See, e.g., Palmer v. A.H. Robins
Co., Inc., 684 P.2d 187, 220 (Colo. 1984) (Colorado law; although warranting close scrutiny,
the court upheld the $6.2 million punitive award, a 10:1 ratio); Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day,
615 P.2d 621, 624 n.3 (Alaska 1980) (Alaska law; reduced $2.9 million award to $500,000 as
excessive, noting the relationship to actual damages as a factor). But see, e.g., Campus Sweater
& Sportswear Co. v. M.B. Kahn Constr. Co., 515 F. Supp. 64, 106 (D.S.C. 1979) ("One must
look to behavior, not to results, to determine the need to admonish .... "), aff'd, 644 F.2d
877 (4th Cir. 1981). For a more detailed discussion on limiting punitive awards, see Wheeler,
supra note 41, at 314-320.
78. See, e.g., Oliver v. Raymark Ind., Inc., 799 F.2d 95 (3rd Cir. 1986) (the court held punitive
damages precluded in negligence action if compensatory damages not awarded); Wussow v.
Commercial Mechanisms, Inc., 90 Wis. 2d 136, 279 N.W.2d503 (1979), rev'd, 97 Wis. 2d 136,
293 N.W.2d 897, 898-99 (1980) (Supreme Court of Wisconsin permitted an award of punitive
damages where the claim for compensatory damage has previously been settled). But see, e.g.,
Lindquist v. Ayerst Laboratories, Inc., 227 Kan. 308, 607 P.2d 1339 (1980) (the jury held for
the manufacturer on the issue of compensatory damages; thus, the court directed a verdict for
the defendant on the punitive damages issue because a compensatory award was prerequisite to
receiving a punitive award).
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The awarding of punitive damages to plaintiffs has been called a
windfall.7 9 In response to this criticism, a few states have established state
funds into which some or all of a successful plaintiff's punitive damage
award is placed. 0
CONCLUSION
The doctrine of punitive damages is old and recently has expanded
into new areas of the law, including product liability, for which it was
not created. Problems and controversies have developed with its expansion.
In the past several years, more states have begun to reevaluate the doctrine
and propose changes. Although punitive damages elicit the potential for
abuse, they offer a valuable tool in controlling corporate conduct. Punitive
damages should not necessarily be eliminated, but the doctrine needs more
of the thorough analysis it is receiving and a fine-tuning to the needs of
particular jurisdictions.
David J. Gilmartin*
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80.

*

See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-102(4) (Supp.
(e.g., water resource projects)); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
and 60% to the Public Medical Assistance Trust
otherwise to a general revenue fund); IowA REv.
willful and wanton but not directed specifically
plaintiff and remainder distributed to state fund).
B.S., University of Illinois, 1984; J.D. Candidate,

1986) (one-third of the award to a state fund
768.73(2) (West Supp. 1987) (40% to plaintiff
Fund if personal injury or wrongful death,
STAT. § 668A.1 (Supp. 1987) (if conduct is
at plaintiff, then up to 25% distributed to
Notre Dame Law School, 1988.

